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Abstract 
When psychotherapists reify the concepts they are using to describe human 
experiences, both therapist and patient are likely to end up with befuddled thinking, 
and become unable to grasp the lived experience of the emotional turmoil the patient 
is struggling with. In this context, proper use of language is of vital importance, and 
the first task of the psychotherapist is to think clearly about what she is doing in the 
therapy room and the words she uses. This essay attempts to clarify some of these 
issues, and to discuss their relevance to the practice of psychotherapy. 
 
Introduction  
Some fifty years ago, Jean-Paul Sartre published a tape transcript of a “psychoanalytic 
dialogue” he obtained from a patient.2 The dialogue was recorded secretly by the 
patient during an analytic session. Once the patient had produced the tape-recorder 
from his pocket, the analyst refused to say anything other than demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of the patient from the consulting room. It transpired that the 
patient had taken a long time to consider such an action. He wanted the analyst to 
explain what he had done to him over the years. He also wanted to know what the 
therapeutic cure was supposed to be. Most importantly, he wanted to have this 
discussion face to face without the couch, and he wanted an audio record of what the 
analyst said. 
 
The transcript clearly conveys a sense of panic the analyst feels in this unexpected 
situation, where the patient has suddenly taken on an active role, upsetting the power 
balance between the two participants. Besides demanding an explanation of the 
“science” of psychoanalysis, the patient challenges the dubious nature of his analyst’s 
previous pronouncements (interpretations) by using the latter’s concepts such as 
castration fear or father-complex to explain the analyst’s agitated behaviour in the 
present situation. The result is a comic but also thought-provoking record of the 
exchanges between an expert and a person labelled as a patient, in an “analytic hour” 
that has undergone a most unusual mutation.  
 
Sartre has commented that the crucial point about the “dialogue” is that the hitherto 
passive “patient” – the object of the analysis – has become an active agent, that is, a 
subject. The idea of subject is fundamental to Sartre’s existentialist philosophy. In 
                                                1	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acting as a subject, the patient demands to be treated as autonomous. To turn the table 
on his challenger, the psychoanalyst declares the patient dangerous and out of touch 
with reality. In doing so, he is trying to wrest back control through labelling the 
patient with words that could condemn the latter to psychiatric incarceration. Words 
uttered by professionals carry the authority of institutional sanction, reflecting the 
power imbalance between experts and lay-people. 
 
Some years ago, a collection of papers (Casement, 2004) was published with the 
provocative title Who Owns Psychoanalysis? It contains material about the conflicts 
between different factions within psychoanalysis. But what interests me is more the 
fact that “ownership” has arisen as an issue in the first place. The idea of ownership is 
not just to do with possession of physical resources and means of production in the 
material world; it is, more importantly, to do with control of the superstructure of a 
society, of which language and meanings are vital constituents. Ownership, in this 
regard, embodies the right to decide what orthodoxy is and what is judged to be 
heresy. It also controls the delineation of who is “in” and who is “out”, thus defining 
“us” versus “them”. In exercising such power, those who owns the right to produce 
meanings ensure that truth, or Truth, is established in accordance with their view. 
 
Freud no doubt saw himself as the sole originator, and hence owner, of 
psychoanalysis; and to that extent, he believed he was the guarantor of the purity of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. His demand that his disciples should guard the “pure gold 
of psychoanalysis” was not dissimilar to Saint Paul’s instruction to Christians to 
“guard the Gospel”. The phenomenon of claiming authority through lineage (“I was 
analysed by her, who was analysed by him, who was analysed by Freud.”) is similar 
to the apostolic genealogy linking the current Pope all the way back to Saint Peter, 
who was supposedly enthroned by Christ as the rock (the head) of the Catholic 
Church. A fundamental conflict between different sects of psychoanalysts revolves 
round the question of who is truly faithful to the Founder, or who has definitively 
preserved the gem of psychoanalytic truths. In this regard, it is not inappropriate to 
compare the whole edifice of psychoanalysis to a religious faith.3  
 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that Adam Phillips (2007), the general 
editor of the New Penguin Freud series, wanted to avoid “psychoanalytic politics” 
when organising the new translation of Freud’s work. He wanted as many non-
analysts as possible to do the translation so as to allow different voices to emerge. He 
believed that to promote a single-translator Standard Edition would lead to dogmatic 
canon formation harmful to psychoanalysis, particularly if only analysts were 
involved or if the project was under the control of psychoanalytic institutions.  
 
According to Adam Phillips (2014), Freud began his exploration of the human psyche 
with uncertainty but ended up becoming overly certain. In my view, dogmatic 
certainty gives a false sense of power which stifles creativity and new discoveries, 
whereas genuine openness extends the horizon of understanding. Treating all theories, 
including psychoanalysis, as provisional may prove to be a fruitful way of thinking 
about psychotherapy. 
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Putting “Neuro” into Psychoanalysis? 
While Freud’s work is undoubtedly instrumental in making the unconscious a 
dominant concept in modern culture, this concept has been grappled with by many 
thinkers long before Freud (see Ellenberger, 1970). Thus it is important that the 
development of Freud’s ideas be seen in the context of the intellectual history of 
Europe, particularly in relation to nineteenth century German Idealism in philosophy 
(e.g., Hegel or Schelling; see Fenichel, 2015). As Ffytche (2011) has cogently argued, 
the question is not whether Freud inherited the unconscious from earlier writers, but 
which version of it did he inherit. It would be fair to say that the emergence of the 
notion of the unconscious in Freud’s work (and related concepts like repression or the 
Oedipus Complex) was made possible by the cultural milieu of the day. Thus it is not 
helpful to talk about Freud “discovering” the unconscious (or the Oedipus Complex) 
as similar to Joseph Priestley discovering oxygen in the field of chemistry.   
 
A more fundamental question to “what is the unconscious” is no doubt what is 
consciousness? This is a conundrum that philosophers have been (unsuccessfully, I 
feel) struggling with throughout history. In contemporary psychoanalysis, there is an 
attempt to bring the neurosciences to bear on this question (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 
2000; Levin, 2003; Oppenheim, 2005; Solms, 2013; Solms & Turnbull 2002).  
 
The thrust of Mark Solms’ work is to bolster the credibility of Freud’s ideas by 
appealing to the findings of neurosciences (hence neuropsychoanalysis). Solms 
believes that his work is a continuation of Freud’s 1895 “Project for a Scientific 
Psychology”, with the aim of establishing the neuroscientific basis for 
psychoanalysis. In working towards this goal, Solms also tackles the question of how 
consciousness has arisen.  
 
While Solms does acknowledge that the “hard problem” of consciousness is far from 
resolved (how consciousness emerges from matter), he is adamant that the “easy 
problem” of consciousness (how neuro-chemical processes correlate with cognitive 
functions) has already been subject to rigorous research resulting in a lot of important 
findings. His own solution to the “hard problem” is “dual-aspect monism”, which 
suggests that: 
 
we are made of only one type of stuff but … this stuff is perceived in two different 
ways… in our essence we are neither mental nor physical beings… the brain is 
made of stuff that appears “physical” when viewed from the outside (as an object) 
and “mental” when viewed from the inside (as a subject). When I perceive myself 
externally (in the mirror, for example) and internally (through introspection), I am 
perceiving the same thing in two different ways (as a body and a mind, 
respectively). (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p. 56, original emphasis) 
 
Essentially, Solms is saying that the distinction between mind and brain is just an 
artefact of perception. He then goes on to say: 
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The mind itself is unconscious, but we perceive it consciously by looking inwards. 
It is this capacity for “looking inwards” (for introspection or self-awareness) that 
is the most essential property of a mind. (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, pp. 76-77, 
emphasis added) 
 
What Solms has said here begs a number of questions. First, the phrase “the mind 
itself” implies there is a boundary to the mind which could be distinguished from 
what is not mind; secondly, the “we” is deemed to be separate from the “mind” as this 
“we” could “perceive” the mind, i.e., “we” being the subject and “mind” the object 
and “looking inwards” being the action of the “we” on the “mind”; and thirdly, he 
said “looking inwards” is an important capacity of the “mind”, which suggests “we” 
(the subject doing the looking) and the “mind” (that which is being looked at) are one 
and the same, which is confusing. Moreover, the word “inwards” is difficult to 
explicate, where is “inwards” and how is looking inwards achieved?  
 
My view is that the mind is inseparable from a person’s immediate phenomenal 
experience, and is not some thing transparent to itself. To analyse what it means by 
“the mind looking into itself” will only lead to an infinite regress, i.e., is the mind 
analysing what it means by the mind looking into the mind? This is pure confusion. 
 
Solms’ distinction between perceiving himself externally and perceiving himself 
internally is equally perplexing. Seeing one’s image in a mirror cannot be equated 
with seeing one’s self because the mirror-image is not a self, but the optical effect of 
light on a reflective surface. Also, this seeing is not external in the literal sense – this 
seeing oneself in the mirror is always an internal process involving the visual cortex, 
the prefrontal lobe, and the complex function of self-recognition. To say this 
“external” perception and perceiving oneself through introspection are two different 
ways of perceiving “the same thing” (where and what is this “thing”?) has set up a 
dubious distinction, to say the least.  
 
Solms’ “monism” implies that matter is the only stuff there is, which means “we”, the 
brain, and the mind are all made of the same stuff. The unanswered question is how 
does this one and only stuff (matter) separate into brain and mind, and is this “we” the 
brain or the mind? To me, dual-aspect monism has not achieved its goal of resolving 
the “hard problem” of consciousness. 
 
In relation to psychoanalysis, Solms (2013) argues that the id is associated with the 
brainstem and subcortical structures regulating affective states, while the ego is 
associated with the prefrontal cortex and executive functions. The brain structures 
involved in interoceptive perceptions and affect regulation are seen as the 
neurological basis for Freud’s pleasure principle, and hence locating id in these 
structures is deemed appropriate. As consciousness, in Solms’ view, is generated by 
the brainstem, he believes consciousness is not to do with perception and cognition 
(functions of the frontal lobe, where the ego is located) but with affect and instinct, 
that is, the id. As consciousness is not generated in the cortex, he concludes that the 
ego is unconscious while the id is conscious, thus turning Freud’s idea on its head! 
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The logic of Solms’ argument is as follows: id is defined (not independently verified) 
as to do with affect (the pleasure principle), and as the brainstem is correlated with 
affect and also with consciousness, so id must be localised in the brainstem and is 
therefore “conscious”. But this is merely giving the label “id” to the brainstem 
processes without adding anything. Thus Solms’ reasoning is circular or tautological. 
 
Solms further suggests that the therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalysis is through 
changing the brain by “rekindling” critical periods of frontal lobe development 
artificially via the regressive transference relationship, and through extending the 
functional sphere of influence of the prefrontal lobes via language and internalisation, 
thereby strengthening the ego (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, pp. 287-289). This is an 
unsubstantiated hypothesis that is struggling to put the prefix “neuro” to 
“psychoanalysis” - a rather futile attempt. 
 
In all of this, Solms uses the word “consciousness” in a confused way. The assertion 
that consciousness is generated solely by the brainstem does not distinguish 
wakefulness from either phenomenal consciousness or consciousness of the self. 
Certainly if the brainstem is damaged, an individual person would lose 
consciousness/wakefulness; but is a functioning brainstem, without the prefrontal 
cortex (and other brain structures), enough to ensure the experience of phenomenal 
consciousness or personal self-consciousness? Consciousness depends on the 
brainstem but is not identical with it. 
 
In the concluding chapter in The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, Kircher and 
David (2003) have outlined the central qualities of phenomenal consciousness at the 
core of selfhood: sense of temporal continuity/consistency, sense of agency, and sense 
of distinction from the environment. There is no ontological identity between 
phenomenal consciousness (which cannot be localised in the neurological 
architecture) and brain states. Perhaps the search for the neurological location of the 
ego or the id is an impossible enterprise. While acknowledging Freud’s contribution 
to human understanding, the Chicago philosopher and analyst Jonathan Lear (2005) 
has pointed out that Freud’s belief in the possibility of explaining the mind in 
biological terms is misguided. 
 
Whence and Wherefore Oedipus 
Language is the human phenomenon par excellence, and it constitutes a tool for the 
exercise of power in various ways. Not only in the world of psychotherapy, but in 
most areas of life – politics, the law, even the home behind closed doors. Whichever 
faction a psychoanalyst belongs to, the power she wields over her patient is largely to 
do with her ownership (and deployment) of a special language that renders the latter 
either clueless about what is going on or incapable of assuming the role of an 
independent subject. In fashioning a mechanistic language they believe represent the 
truth about all human beings, many analysts, including Freud, have committed a 
category error, which has hampered the healthy development of psychotherapy and 
ensnared generations of practitioners. This error is the reification of often ad hoc or 
context-dependent concepts into objects with thing-like properties, thus bestowing 
upon these concepts an ontological status they do not possess. 
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One example of a category error is the statement “cortex without a brainstem can 
never be conscious” (Solms, 2013 p. 12). “Cortex” is an entity in the physical world 
whereas “conscious” is a description of a subjective phenomenon in the experiential 
world. We can (and do) say “I am conscious” but not (as Solms does) “my brainstem 
is conscious” or “my memory is conscious”. To mix the two up is a classic category 
error which leads to dubious theorising.  
 
Another example is the Oedipal Complex. Instead of being treated as a metaphor for 
the purpose of giving meaning to a particular person’s experience (originally Freud’s 
own), it has, through a process of theory building, become something universal, to be 
discovered through analysis. Similarly, “repression” has become an occurrence in the 
mind, with objective existence and power to control a person’s life, something that 
can only be unearthed through psychoanalysis. Thus, analysis is not understood as a 
tentative, and often erroneous, groping towards a hermeneutical grasp of what has 
happened or is happening between individuals, but as a scientific procedure that 
uncovers the causes and mechanisms of neurosis. 
 
Like many myths in antiquity, there are many variants of the Greek myth Oedipus 
Rex, but Freud took the one that conformed to his idea of the incestuous triangle in 
order to create a theory of childhood fantasy being the cause of neurosis. In other 
variants, the exile of Oedipus is the focus, not incest, parricide, or Oedipus’s self-
mutilation. The theme of wandering, of alienation, of suffering, of the difficulties of 
home-coming, is prominent in Greek tragedies, of which Oedipus is just one example. 
Another Greek epic, Odyssey, also has wandering at its heart - Odysseus’ heroic 
attempt to return to Ithaca, his home. If wandering and alienation were given 
centrality in the human drama of neurosis (instead of parricide and incest), the history 
of psychoanalysis might have turned out differently. 
 
The use of Greek myths in literary or philosophical discussions has a long history 
before Freud, and commentaries on works like Oedipus or Antigone often focused on 
ethical self-consciousness and responsibility (e.g., Hegel). Because of its plot 
involving incest and parricide, Oedipus was suppressed in England for a long time, 
but there was already strong fascination with it well before Freud coined the term 
“Oedipus Complex”. As Buchanan (2010, p. 4) said, “[i]t may nevertheless seem a 
large leap from uncovering this suppressed classical hero to believing that his image 
held the secret of all of human nature”. Buchanan has argued that Oedipus is at the 
centre of humanist discourse as a symbol of human self-awareness and a reflection of 
the limits of rationality. He suggests there was a nineteenth century philosophical 
strand that saw this myth as representing a traumatic but necessary transition from 
animistic, matriarchal nature-worship and superstition to enlightened patriarchal 
humanism. Thus Freud’s interpretation of Oedipus Rex is not the only viable one. 
 
After Freud, there have been many writers who tried to interpret Oedipus from 
perspectives different from psychoanalysis. Perhaps the most well-known is Anti-
Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who have mounted a sustained critique 
of Freud’s totalising dogma of the Oedipus Complex. Deleuze and Guattari (1983)4 
                                                4	   Unless	   the	   reader	   is	   a	   French	   philosophy	   expert,	   otherwise	   Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	  (1983)	  would	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  follow.	  It	  is	  a	  text	  full	  of	  anti-­‐individualist,	  anti-­‐ego,	  anarchist,	  and	  revolutionary	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  it	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  praised	  
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2018, 7 (1), 84-105.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v7i1.1584 
 
90 
believe that “oedipalisation” is a tool for oppression, and they argue that not only is 
Freud not radical enough, in fact psychoanalysis is very much part of the 
establishment. They suggest the “great discovery of psychoanalysis”, i.e., the 
discovery of “the production of the unconscious”, has been neutralized by the 
postulation of the Oedipus Complex (the “daddy-mommy-me” myth) which has 
introduced idealism into psychoanalysis. In their view, Freud has neglected the 
importance of Marx’s materialist philosophy. They suggest that Freud’s dislike of, 
and inability to work with, psychotic patients is to do with the latter not developing 
transference with the analyst and not capable of grasping Oedipal interpretations. 
Deleuze and Guattari describe such patients as resisting being oedipalised. Instead of 
psychoanalysis, they believe schizoanalysis is the way forward. 
 
Whether we agree with Deleuze and Guattari or not, it is no doubting that right from 
the beginning, questions about the unconscious (and related issues such as the 
Oedipus Complex or repressed sexuality) have occupied the thinking public in more 
ways than one, and have led to disagreements, debates and controversies. 
 
Reification of Experience 
Language is fundamentally metaphorical – more often than not, words are used to 
achieve a purpose rather than pointing to things. Wittgenstein famously said “the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language”.5 A dictionary does not exhaust the 
meanings of words: usage changes and evolves, and no one is bound by the normative 
definition of words. Even in the area of the law, whether in day-to-day practice or 
legislative processes, the meaning of words is often subject to fierce debate resulting 
in unresolved disagreement. 
 
Thus, words often serve as gateways to meanings in psychotherapy, not labels for 
concrete objects. While I am not denying that words, e.g., “table”, may point to 
physical things, my contention is, for psychologists and psychotherapists, it is the 
metaphorical quality of language and the connotative complexity of words that we 
should attend to. 
 
In an important, but neglected, paper published half a century ago, the psychoanalyst 
James Home has elaborated a cogent critique of the kind of mechanistic 
psychoanalysis which delights in obscure vocabularies and meaningless assertions. 
Home (1966) argues that psychoanalysis belongs to the realm of humanities rather 
than the world of science. The confusion between “causes” (appropriate for physical 
sciences) and “reasons” (required for understanding suffering and psychotherapy) is, 
Home suggests, what led Freud into the trap of reification. Home said “a meaning is 
not the product of causes but the creation of a subject” (1966, p. 43), and “[t]o define 
mind as the meaning of behaviour is to remind ourselves that mind is not a thing and 
                                                by	  Michel	  Foucault	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  discussion	  here	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  as	  well	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  of	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  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  to	  psychoanalysis	  and	  psychotherapy	  is	  cogently	  argued	  in	  Heaton	  (2010).	  	  	  
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2018, 7 (1), 84-105.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v7i1.1584 
 
91 
cannot therefore be analysed as such. Mind as meaning is a quality inseparable from 
life, as is the concept of a subject” (p. 46). Furthermore, mind is not accessible to 
introspection, because “to introspection it [the mind] is infinitely recessive. We can 
never observe the ‘I’ that observes” (p. 47). 
 
Mind, or “self” can only be known to the subject through her indwelling of an 
embodied existence in an inseparable relationship to the physical and social world. 
This is the subject’s experience of phenomenal consciousness, not open to 
investigation with the logic and methods of physical science. 
 
Writing a patient’s official “story” is a manifestation of institutional control that the 
professional has over the patient. It is the expert defining the “self” of the patient. In 
such writings, reification is prevalent. It is common for psychiatrists to write clinical 
reports with statements like this: “mental state examination revealed a thin lady 
with...” – the implication of this way of talking is that assessing a person’s emotional 
experience is akin to physical examination in physical medicine where findings such 
as “physical examination revealed a tender lump in the upper right abdominal area...” 
are important. The reification of the person (and her experience) into a thing is so 
blatant in such clinical reports it is hard to understand why so many psychiatrists 
remain unaware of what they are doing. 
 
There are analysts who acknowledge the distinction between the concept of meaning 
and that of cause, but still stick to a causal model of psychological distress, arguing 
that the intertwining of meaning and cause is what characterises the human subject.6 
But how such intertwining is possible is often left unexplained, leaving unresolved the 
age-old dualist problem of how non-material aspects of experience (meaning, reason, 
belief) could produce causal effects in the material world (observable behaviour, 
physical mechanisms, etc). 
 
The implication of Home’s argument for psychoanalysis is profound. It is a different 
language, and a different practice, that has to be developed, not one modelled on 
“mechanistic medicine” (“mental state examination revealed a thin lady with…”). 
Although coming from a different perspective, the British clinical psychologist David 
Smail has written much about how both psychoanalytic and cognitive-behaviour 
psychotherapies have failed to do justice to human experience: 
 
[P]sychotherapy takes place in an ideological context of which it itself forms a 
part... The kind of psychotherapy which is subversive of ideology in the sense used 
here reveals a world in which we live and which gives us pain. It also gives back 
meanings to our feelings: for example, it may reveal depression not as the 
undesirable state of a disordered mechanism, but as the inevitable emotional 
experience of someone whose practised way of doing things no longer works, and 
                                                6	  This	   is	  what	   the	   analyst	  David	  Bell	   (2010)	  has	   suggested.	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   that	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   meaning	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   a	   symptom,	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as essential emotional accompaniment of the difficulty of learning to do things 
differently. Psychotherapy certainly does not cure anything... and of itself probably 
doesn’t change anything very radically; what it can do is offer to support a 
subjective view of an actual world which patients may then (but also may not) want 
and be able to influence in some way. (Smail, 1987, pp. 398-401)7 
 
One way the psychoanalyst exercises power over her patient is to monopolise the 
interpretation of the latter’s problem: if the patient accepts an interpretation, she 
acknowledges the analyst is in possession of the truth; if she rejects the interpretation, 
the analyst can (and often does) label her as showing resistance, a symptom of her 
neurosis. Thus the truth about the patient is always in the hands of the analyst. While 
some analysts (including Freud himself) are not unaware of this criticism, in practice, 
such power monopoly is difficult to change. 
 
In relation to this, Lear (2005) has tried to defend psychoanalysis thus: 
“philosophically speaking, the question is not whether some analysts are bullies. 
Rather, the question is, ‘When psychoanalysis is practiced well, is there even so a 
tendency towards bullying?’” (p. 21). But this is not a valid defence because (1) who 
decides whether this or that analyst is “practising well”, and (2) bullying of patients, 
especially by Freud, does matter as this leads to inaccurate information (or 
“evidence”) being accrued for the formulation of (questionable) theories. 
 
Reification happens not only in psychoanalysis but in most forms of psychological 
therapy. The central concept of the many variants of cognitive-behaviour therapy 
(CBT), “negative automatic thoughts” (NATs), provides another example of how 
experience (in this case, thinking) is turned into things. Many practitioners talk about 
NATs as if they are entities in the head, and therapy is, simplistically, a matter of 
replacing these disorder-causing thoughts with positive or adaptive ones. The 
mechanical method of getting the patient to write down, repeatedly, positive 
statements (e.g., “I am not a failure”) on a piece of paper (“thought record”) is 
deemed the way to ensure therapy success. If we stop and ask, Where do thoughts 
reside?, we would quickly realise that the talk of NATs (or “positive thoughts”) may 
not be a meaningful way to describe, let alone understand, human experience. But so 
often this is blithely ignored. 
 
Perhaps it would not be presumptuous of me to extend Wittgenstein’s dictum and say 
“the meaning of an experience is in its living”. The crux of the matter is, meaning 
cannot be captured, framed or pinned down once and for all. It might be more fruitful 
to think of meaning as unstable, in flux, emergent. People who are totally committed 
to one particular view, who believe they possess certainty – people with God on their 
side – find it impossible to see the world, in all its messiness, clearly. 
                                                7	   The	   late	   David	   Smail	   was	   a	   trenchant	   critic	   of	   capitalism,	   analysing	   how	   it	  underlies	   human	  misery	   and	  psychological	   problems.	  He	   has	   produced	   a	   large	  body	  of	  work	  which	  provides	  a	  rigorous	  critique	  of	  psychotherapy. 
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Living in the Present 
When therapists turn experiences into objects, they often talk in terms of “the past” as 
if the latter has an independent existence, in which all sorts of things could be found, 
particularly “complexes” underlying psychological symptoms.   
 
My contention is the past is not a place; it does not exist in the ontological sense. The 
concept of the past, the present and the future constitutes our way of talking about 
experiences. We do not go back to the past as such, nor could we stay in the past. This 
is a metaphorical way of speaking for particular purposes of communication.  
 
Phenomenologically, we always, and can only, experience the present, and can never 
escape from it. Even when we feel we are in the past, we do so in the present. 
However, it is important to understand that the present is not a fixed point in time, as 
experiencing is always a phenomenon in motion, so to speak. There is no stopping at 
a particular present. The future is not a place either - it is our way of imagining (or 
anticipating) what might happen next (or the day after). The future will inevitably 
become the present, in the sense that whatever we have imagined does (or does not, as 
the case may be) turn out the way we imagine, and we experience that in the present. 
The felt continuity of past-present-future is how we experience our relationship to the 
space-time structure of the world, in which we continue to act in accordance with our 
personal circumstances and the cultural milieu we inhabit. 
 
This way of understanding the past does not deny the experience of memories, but it 
does suggest that memories are not things. It is more helpful to talk in terms of 
remembering, an act of thinking in relation to what has happened. While there are 
neurophysiological correlates to the act of remembering, these correlates are not fixed 
entities in the brain, and they are not identical to what we remember. We can never 
point to a memory on a brain scan. Memories change as contexts vary in which the act 
of remembering is undertaken. 
 
Thus, when a psychotherapist helps a patient “recover” a crucial memory, it is not a 
matter of rummaging in the bottom of a drawer “in the mind” to retrieve an object, but 
an act of jointly creating an experience of the patient thinking, in the present, of what 
has happened in the past. As such, it is of paramount importance that the context of 
remembering, not only the patient’s current life but also the patient’s relationship with 
the therapist, be taken into account when trying to understand whatever the patient 
has managed to remember. Interpretation is not a technique for discovering some 
thing from the past but a way of pointing to possibilities of meaning. 
 
While many psychoanalysts understand that the past is never fixed, but a creation in 
the present and a realm of experience full of vicissitudes, they may still see the 
recovery of the patient’s past as a major aim of therapy (as if it is already in the mind 
waiting to be found), and believe only they have the knowledge and authority to 
ascertain whether the “past” thus unearthed is the real past or not. 
 
The Ego, the Mind and the Soul 
Psychoanalysis has evolved significantly since the time of Freud. However, the trap 
of reification continues to affect many, particularly in theoretical writings, even if not 
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in therapy work. For example, while acknowledging the limitation of Freud’s 
mechanistic models, some analysts still lapse into talking about the id, the ego or the 
superego as entities: 
 
The id is entirely unconscious. Its contents can be considered to be equivalent to the 
unconscious of Freud’s earlier topographical model. Its existence is inferred from 
derivatives such as dreams or slips of the tongue. The energy of the id is derived 
between two types of instincts: the life and the death instincts. (Lemma, 2003, p. 
20; emphasis added)8  
 
When Freud formulated his ideas of the structure of the psyche, he used the common 
German words “it” (es), “I” (ich) and “over-I” (über-ich) to describe the three aspects 
of mind: the irrational, the rational and the moralistic-punitive. Freud conceptualised 
these forms of mental functioning as concrete mechanisms, even though he chose to 
use personal pronouns to label them. Perhaps the early English translators wanted to 
use words which looked scientific or specialist, rather than pronouns, in order to give 
psychoanalysis a more respectable sheen. Unfortunately, the translation of the 
German words into “id”, “ego” and “superego” has further reified the formulation, 
making it much easier for the pronouns to acquire thing-like properties, to such an 
extent that many psychoanalysts (and other people) talk about the id (or the ego or 
superego) as if it has an existence independent of the actions of a human person, with 
its own “contents”, “energy”, etc.9 
 
If, instead of “ego”, we stick to “I” (but not as Freud did – he used the phrase “the I” 
[das Ich], which is reifying), we would no doubt think in terms of agency or 
subjectivity: “I” being the grammatical subject, the first person of language use, the 
source of actions, the creator of meaning. Unlike the connotation of the word “ego”, 
“I” does not reside “inside” a person’s “mind”. “I” is the active person herself. I am 
struggling with the experience of conflicts – conflicts do not happen in a place called 
my “mind”. When I said my mind is beset with conflicts, I am talking metaphorically, 
not referring to an internal place. 
 
Another example of the problem of translation, as McGrath (2011) has pointed out, is 
the translation of the German word Trieb into English as “instinct” instead of the 
more accurate “drive”, thus concealing the continuity of Freud’s metapsychology with 
German idealist philosophy (such as the work of Schelling), where Trieb is of central 
importance. This concern has been expressed by Jean Laplanche - that collapsing 
“drive” (Trieb) and instinct (Instinkt) into one concept has made psychoanalysis 
vulnerable to biological reductionism. The “soul” was another key idea in idealist 
philosophy, but its appearance in Freud’s work (die Seele in German) has been 
                                                8	   This	   quote	   is	   from	   the	   psychoanalyst	   Alessandra	   Lemma,	  who	   has	   discussed	  Freud’s	  concept	  of	  id	  as	  process	  but	  still	   lapses	  into	  a	  way	  of	  talking	  that	  reifies	  the	  id-­‐process	  into	  an	  entity.	  	  9	  Authors	  such	  as	  Sander	  Gilman	  and	  Bruno	  Bettelheim	  have	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  the	  translation	  of	  Ich	  and	  Es	   into	  English	  as	  “ego”	  and	  “id”	   is	  a	  barrier	  to	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  psychoanalysis. 
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rendered as “mind” in Strachey’s Standard Edition, probably to avoid the impression 
of being “unscientific”.  
 
There are of course practitioners in the psychoanalytic tradition who are not afraid of 
using notions such as the soul. The most notable is Carl Jung, who broke away from 
Freud and established a separate therapeutic tradition, analytical psychology. One 
contemporary Jungian, Wolfgang Giegerich, has become influential in the Jungian 
world.10 Here is Giegerich in his own words: 
 
As the human being is dethroned from the central place around which 
psychological life allegedly has to revolve, the psyche can finally in truth be 
recognized as what Jung tried to see it: as objective or autonomous psyche, or as I 
would prefer to say, as the logical life of the soul, a life that is its own (even though 
it lives through us and needs us to give expression to it). (Giegerich, 1996, p. 24) 
 
It is a naïve and narcissistic mistake to take oneself so seriously as to confuse 
oneself with the true subject of the soul’s life (what or whom it is about). We are no 
more than the stage or place where it happens, but where it happens for its own 
sake not for ours. The fact that it needs us to acquire a real presence in the world 
and undergo its process of further-determination must not go to our heads 
(Giegerich, 2012, p. 312).  
 
Jungians, like Giegerich, often talk about the psyche or soul as if it in itself is a 
sentient being with a life of its own. This anthropomorphism is confusing at best. To 
fend off criticism, Jungians might say this is only a metaphorical or poetic way of 
speaking in aid of understanding. The question is why not speak plainly, focusing on 
the subject (“I”) of psychological life, instead of introducing such quasi-mystical 
vocabulary?11 
 
To be fair to Giegerich, he has usefully analysed contemporary issues such as 
globalisation (Giegerich 1996), but the tendency towards anthropomorphism 
(“globalisation” as autonomous being) is still his stumbling block. To eliminate 
(“dethrone”) the individual from a description of (psychological) reality is 
Giegerich’s attempt at revising the Jungian doctrine of individuation. But his 
colleague, Greg Mogenson, has judged this attempt a failure, arguing that the 
                                                10	   See	   Giegerich	   (1996,	   2004	   or	   2012)	   for	   a	   taste	   of	   his	   work.	   One	   devoted	  admirer,	   a	   Californian	   Jungian,	   Jennifer	  M.	   Sandoval,	   said	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   a	  talk	   about	   Giegerich’s	   work,	   “There’s	   no	   doubt,	   people	   have	   trouble	   with	  Giegerich”	  (Sandoval,	  2013)	  –	  because	  his	  writing	  is	  dense	  and	  difficult	  to	  follow!	  11	  Although	  Giegerich	  has	   said	   to	  Ann	  Casement	   that	   for	  him	   “there	   is	  no	   such	  thing	  as	  a	  soul.	  The	  soul	  does	  not	  exist.	  It	  is	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  logical	  life	  at	  work	  in	  what	   happens,	   no	   more”	   (Casement,	   2011).	   This	   admission	   makes	   it	   more	  intriguing	  why	  he	  did	  not	  use	  less	  mystifying	  language	  in	  his	  writings. 
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distinction between the individual and the collective remains vitally important 
(Mogenson, undated). 
 
In a helpful paper on Giegerich’s work, the London-based Jungian Ann Casement has 
published a quote from the personal communication she received from Giegerich 
regarding his way of working with patients: 
 
In the consulting room I try to be present with such a psychologically-trained 
consciousness, but otherwise forget theories and approach the patient unprejudiced 
(as much as is humanly possible) in the spirit of Nowness and Eachness. The 
concentration is on this phenomenon now (this dream, symptom, memory, fantasy 
today). And the question is: what does it need? Here, I think my intuition needs to 
come into play. Great openness. No ‘technique’. No psychological jargon (rarely do 
I use words like anima or shadow or self, etc. I avoid psychological brainwashing 
of my patients: staying with what shows itself!) Undogmatic. Improvisation, 
playing it by ear. This also requires honesty: my honest response at this moment to 
what shows itself. The work can be very different with different patients, but also 
different from session to session with one and the same patient. Openness to the 
Now (which even includes the Now of my mood and my perspective)… Especially 
important is for me the respect for the psychological difference. I try to be present 
in the sessions as the concrete ordinary person that I am (human, all-too-human) 
and to also see the ordinary human being in my patient. (Casement, 2011, pp. 539-
540) 
 
I believe this way of working is the best (as one human being with another, not 
relying on techniques or jargons, but with a receptive and mentalising attitude) – the 
question is, why then does Giegerich theorise in such an opaque and mystifying way? 
 
If an analyst does not think of the id, ego or soul as entities in the mind, she should 
desist from describing a patient’s experience of emotional conflicts in terms of, e.g., 
“a cruel primitive superego watching the patient all the time”, or “the superego 
masquerading as the ego causing the patient enormous pain”. Even if she meant this 
metaphorically, the reader (and of course the patient) would be forgiven for thinking 
that she does believe the superego exists as an entity with a will and power of its own. 
If the analyst argues that her description is only a metaphorical way of talking, it 
would be incumbent on her to make sure that the patient (and readers of her writings) 
does understand this. 
 
It is not my intention to suggest metaphors like “superego” should never be used. 
Psychotherapy would be poorer if that were the case. The use of metaphors leads to 
expansion of the horizon of possibilities. It moves one area of experience to another, 
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one way of remembering to the next, forming a trajectory, an arc of meaning(s), thus 
enriching understanding. But there is always the risk of a metaphor becoming reified, 
or being fixed in its meaning by “experts” with power; and hence the paramount 
importance of finding a way of writing and talking about therapy (especially to 
patients) that does justice to the distinction between the denotative and the 
connotative use of language, and the nature of its fluidity. 
 
The Trap of Theories 
Many psychologists and psychotherapists are beguiled by the excitement of building 
theoretical models, particularly grand, overarching theories. They have the example of 
Freud to follow, whose theories have lasting impact on the evolution of 
psychotherapy. But theory often becomes a trap. This trap does not just affect 
psychoanalysis, but most other therapies as well. One example, from outside the 
psychoanalytic world, is the Self-Regulatory Executive Function Model (S-REF) 
formulated by the British clinical psychologist Adrian Wells12 to explain emotional 
disorders. Structures such as “control”, “appraisal”, “plans” etc are postulated as 
components of the cognitive architecture within a multi-level cognitive processing 
system that determines the emotions and behaviour of the individual. While it is often 
the case that such cognitive models contain scant reference to established 
neuroanatomical structures or neurophysiological pathways, it is implied that the 
model is based on the actual functioning of the brain. 
 
With Freud as exemplar, analysts do not shy away from postulating various psychic 
structures in theory building, even though they might not employ sophisticated-
looking flow diagrams or elaborate acronyms as cognitive therapists often do. Many 
analysts talk about symptoms as the outward expression of deeper psychic structures, 
and therapy is to understand these structures as a route to removing the symptoms. 
(“Removing the symptoms” is a mechanistic medicine way of talking.) It is unclear 
whether any attention is paid to the distinction between causes and reasons in such 
theorising; or whether the theorists are aware of the possibility of committing 
category errors. 
 
The allure of theory building may entice the psychotherapist into talking nonsense 
unawares. John Heaton warned about this pitfall forty years ago, in a book chapter 
that unfortunately is rarely referred to nowadays. Proper theoretical work in 
psychotherapy, he argues, is not about building complicated models of how structures 
in the mind (be they automatic negative schemas or unconscious defence 
mechanisms) cause neurosis. Rather it should be an endeavour to “foster the 
recognition of the limits of language and the contexts in which words come to 
represent”, and to clarify “the nature of action”13 One example Heaton has used to 
illustrate the importance of explicating the workings of language is to ask how we 
would react if a woman said her husband “reported” to her that he had made an 
observation of his feeling of love towards her. No doubt we would think this odd – 
                                                12	   This	   complicated	   sounding	   model	   that	   Wells	   has	   created	   is	   basically	   a	  cognitive	  therapy	  model.	  See	  Wells	  (2000).	  13	  Heaton	  (1979,	  p.	  194). 
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ordinarily the husband would simply tell his wife “I love you”. There is nothing to 
report, so to speak; the declaration of love is not a matter of reporting. 
 
In a similar vein, if, as therapists, we make patients “report” to us their thoughts and 
feelings or symptoms and complexes, we are removing them away from the natural 
situation of first and second person (I-and-you) interaction, and turning their 
experience into a thing that could be observed and reported on (it cannot be; 
experience is subjective). 
 
Theoretical work in psychotherapy is not about producing notions such as Oedipus 
Complex and claiming empirical verifiable status for them. Such notions cannot be 
judged in terms of their truth or otherwise but only in terms of their usefulness in the 
hermeneutic task. Meaning is not the same as truth; psychotherapy is dealing with the 
former not the latter, especially not in its capitalised form. 
 
“I am angry”, “I love you” or “I feel hopeless” is a declaration, a telling, not a 
reporting of internal state which could be observed or content of the mind which 
could be inspected objectively. “Telling people things calls for a response or series of 
actions between the people concerned”14 Even the utterance “my mother has died” is 
not a report but a telling that demands a response (say, from the therapist). 
Psychotherapy is not a theoretical science like physics but a practical science like 
politics or ethics. It inhabits the ordinary world, not the scientific world; its language 
is the vernacular, open-textured and equivocal, not definitions-bound and univocal; it 
cannot be couched in terms of the logical-deductive language of physics. Thus theory 
in psychotherapy cannot take the form of theories in physics or mechanistic medicine. 
Heaton suggests that “[s]ome procedures of psychotherapy could be seen as rituals 
designed to evoke the recognition of powers latent in the patient which are necessary 
to his being able to act in a satisfying way.”15 Therefore, theoretical work in 
psychotherapy is to do with clarifying the language we use to help patients know 
themselves better through interacting with the therapist in relevant and meaningful 
ways, thereby getting in touch with their own resources which might enable them to 
live differently. To use an old-fashioned term, psychotherapy is a moral practice, 
rather than a scientific one. 
 
Apart from bringing Wittgenstein’s work to bear on psychotherapy (Heaton 2010), 
John Heaton has also written extensively about the importance of phenomenology and 
the ancient Greek philosophy of scepticism in helping us think about what 
psychotherapy is.16 Despite criticism of being obscure and impossible to grasp, 
phenomenology has undoubtedly made one major contribution to philosophy: the idea 
of the fundamental inseparability of subjectivity from the world. While we do not 
have to use the rather clunky phrase “being-in-the-world”, it is important to 
acknowledge the interdependence between subject and world - neither can exist 
without the other. Things do not exist, in any meaningful way, in and of themselves. 
They are always in a relationship to the subject who acts on them. 
 
                                                14	  Heaton	  (1979,	  p.	  180).	  15	  Heaton	  (1979,	  p.	  187).	  16	  See,	  for	  example,	  Heaton	  (1993)	  and	  Heaton	  (1997).	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One central concept in phenomenology is intentionality - not in the sense of intention 
(as in motive), but “directedness”. The experience of being alive is never an isolated 
“essence”, but a relatedness, a connection (to be “directed” towards) of subjective 
action in and to a world which the subject inhabits. Thus intentionality is that which 
binds subject (person) and object (world) in an indivisible unity. 
 
Heaton (1993) said “[p]sychotherapy depends on the cultural and traditional world in 
which the patient and therapist live and have their being. Conversation, the way we 
move people and are moved, the power of language, all depend on the cultural 
regularities and values embodied in our use of language” (p. 114). Thus people find 
themselves (“have their being”) in the context of a world, and they construct a life in 
and through this world. 
 
Hermeneutics and the Search for Meaning 
If psychotherapy is a project through which we explore and grasp the meaning of 
existence (“have our being”), the question of context must be attended to. In this 
regard, social constructionism offers important insights similar to, though also 
different from, what phenomenology provides.17 The most significant feature of a 
social constructionist perspective is the prominence given to the collective 
construction of meanings, narratives, worldviews, discourses, etc within any 
community. The meaning of a handshake is only intelligible in the sort of modern-
western society like ours, but not in say certain African tribal communities. Within a 
western society, a particular handshake might only be meaningful to you if you are a 
member of, e.g., the Freemasons. By the same token, the meaning of being 
overweight is socially and culturally determined, and its construction is not the result 
of one single individual’s passing whim, although the individual’s psychology has a 
part to play. Even the notion of “self” cannot be taken for granted as a universal, 
unitary given, but as a socially constructed discourse which requires reflexive analysis 
in the context of specific socio-cultural and political circumstances. 
 
The social constructionist notion of narrative is closely associated with story-telling, 
myth-making, and the idea of “there could be meaning in all this”. A narrative must 
not be divorced from the social world from which it arises. To put experiences into a 
narrative is to enable meanings to emerge, to make possible the formation of a 
Gestalt, to create a world out of chaos, out of the void, almost as God did at the dawn 
of the universe, as the first chapter of the Book of Genesis so poetically describes. 
This is also poetically portrayed in Saint John’s Gospel: “In the beginning there was 
the Word, and the Word was with God and God created the world through the 
Word…” We don’t have to be a Christian to see beauty in the Genesis myth or in 
Saint John’s description. We don’t have to take this literally; we only need to think 
about it poetically, metaphorically – how the Word has made the world! 
 
In psychotherapy, narratives can be constructed at different levels: the level of a 
single narrated event; the level of various stories coming together to yield richer 
meaning during a therapy session; the level of narratives constructed through a whole 
                                                
17 There is a large literature in social constructionism; a good starting point is John 
Shotter’s work, e.g., Shotter (1993). 
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therapy over months or years, moving towards a meaningful completion of therapy 
work; or indeed the level of the narrative of a lifetime, of our one and only existence, 
each and every one of us.18 Meaning and narrative are inseparable. From an existentialist point of view, the creation of narratives is our battle against 
meaninglessness (the chaos and void in the Genesis story). This is a noble task to 
which psychotherapy can hopefully contribute. 
 
The hermeneutic turn in twentieth century philosophy has a great impact on the re-
imagining of psychoanalysis as a discipline of narrative-interpretative assimilation of 
the meaning-relationships between symbols and psychological life. Thus 
psychoanalysis cannot be judged according to criteria appropriate for the physical 
sciences which are dealing with objective observations and facts. 
 
Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur believe that psychoanalysis has shown a self-
misunderstanding of itself as a natural science, and thus a hermeneutic revision is 
needed. But Aldolf Grünbaum (1984) is insistent that such revision is unacceptable. 
Grünbaum’s critique of Habermas and Ricoeur is basically saying they have got it 
wrong because Freud did believe psychoanalysis was a natural science whose validity 
could be tested in objective ways.19 Grünbaum is missing the point: the revisionist 
aim of authors like Habermas and Ricoeur is precisely to re-interpret psychoanalysis 
in such a way as to draw out its real contribution to human knowledge, 
notwithstanding Freud’s aligning psychoanalysis with the natural sciences. To 
Ricoeur, the criteria to judge the validity of psychoanalytic theory and therapy are: 
coherence, narrative intelligibility, interpretative consistency and usefulness to the 
patient (Ricoeur 1981). The value of psychoanalysis is in contributing to this 
hermeneutic turn, regardless of what Grünbaum said about Freud’s intention.   
 
Cultivating Intuition and Ordinariness 
To borrow Winnicott’s idea of “transitional object”,20 it is possible to suggest that 
words serve as transitional objects (the “in-betweens”) that bind the subject and the 
world together. While there are psychotherapists who use the idea of words as 
                                                
18 One	  interesting	  work	  which	  captures	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  lifetime	  narrative	  is	  the	   personal	   and	   reflective	   book	   that	   Patrick	   Casement	   (2006),	   a	   British	  psychoanalyst,	  has	  written,	  after	  his	  retirement,	  about	  his	  life	  and	  his	  experience	  of	   becoming	   a	   psychoanalyst.	   Although	   my	   view	   about	   psychoanalysis	   is	  different	  from	  his,	  I	  do	  admire	  his	  work.	   19	  Grünbaum	  spends	  one	  third	  of	  his	  rambling	  1984	  text	  to	  critique	  hermeneutic	  approaches,	  particularly	  the	  work	  of	  Ricoeur	  and	  Habermas.	  He	  also	  rejects	  Karl	  Popper’s	   claim	   that	   psychoanalysis	   does	  not	  meet	   the	   criterion	   of	   falsifiability.	  Grünbaum’s	   aim	   in	   his	   book	   is	   to	   prove	   that	   Freud	   has	   failed	   to	   provide	  incontrovertible	   clinical	   facts	   for	   his	   theory,	   and	   it	   is	   on	   this	   basis	   he	   rejects	  psychoanalysis.	   For	   a	   critique	   of	   Grünbaum’s	   critique,	   see	   Wollheim	   (1993,	  Chapter	  VI,	  pp.	  91-­‐111).	  20	  There	  is	  much	  reference	  to	  “transitional	  objects”	  in	  Winnicott’s	  writings;	  see,	  for	  example,	  the	  first	  chapter	  in	  Winnicott	  (1971,	  pp.	  1-­‐25).	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transitional objects to refer to emotionally significant (childhood) words,21 I am using 
it to suggest that words in general (language as a whole) constitute a “me-but-not-me” 
transitional bridge between subjectivity and the external world. As such, words 
occupy a border (the transitional space) crucial for the development of self-other 
relationships. 
 
Whether we think in terms of the phenomenological connectedness between subject 
and world, or the socially constructed nature of experience, the mediational 
importance of language is indisputable. Therefore, careful analysis of how words are 
used and understood in ordinary life remains the most important task for philosophers 
as well as psychotherapists. It is a task that ensures the transitional space between 
subject and world is shaped in ways that nourish and protect, where life will be 
cultivated and will flourish. 
 
The discerning reader will have noticed that this essay relies on a number of rather 
dated sources. Perhaps it can be argued that, as the old adage goes, “there is nothing 
new under the sun”, and despite the proliferation of many fashionable “new” 
therapies, we might be falling into the trap of words which do not point to anything 
real if we are fascinated by every new therapy that comes along. 
 
The appropriation of ordinary words and turning them into a new school of “therapy” 
is an oft-repeated phenomenon nowadays. “Acceptance” and “commitment” are part 
of our vernacular for a very long time, before they were requisitioned to christen a 
new therapy. Through either reification (turning words into mechanisms) or 
mystification (“mode deactivation therapy” sounds scientific), ambitious therapists set 
up therapy schools, patent their techniques and disseminate their specialist knowledge 
to those willing to pay. 
 
The psychological therapy world is like a Tower of Babel, where gurus jostle for 
prime positions. Perhaps many therapists find it impossible to give up the alchemist’s 
dream – turning base metal into gold – of creating glossy, enticing products with 
promises such as “I Can Make You Thin”, “I Can Make you Happy”, or “I Can Make 
You Confident”… There is a simple solution for every problem in life, just believe in 
the therapy guru! 
 
What if suffering is the essence of human existence, without which we are perhaps 
not living fully? Should psychotherapists aspire to being alchemists of the mind, 
trying to turn the messiness of human life into the sunny upland of eternal bliss? In all 
this clamour, it would be immensely helpful to keep in mind an idea of Freud’s (even 
if we do not adopt his theories) - that we can only hope, through psychotherapy, to 
turn neurotic misery into ordinary unhappiness. 
 
This essay is not meant to be a definitive critique, nor a comprehensive review, of 
psychoanalysis, but a reflection on a number of questions that have preoccupied me 
for a long time. I do acknowledge the importance of Freud, and am aware of the many 
                                                21	   In	   Favero	   &	   Ross	   (2003),	   the	   authors	   use	   this	   idea	   to	   refer	   to	   emotionally	  significant,	  early	  childhood	  words	  (mother	  tongue),	  particularly	  when	  uttered	  in	  a	  therapy	  situation	  where	  therapy	  is	  conducted	  in	  a	  different	  language	  and	  where	  the	  therapist	  does	  not	  speak	  the	  patient’s	  mother	  tongue.  
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varied and stimulating readings of his work. But turning psychoanalysis (or 
psychotherapy) into a narrow-minded, exclusivist profession may not be for the best – 
it should be “owned” by all who care to think and think deeply and honestly. 
Philosophers and novelists and artists might be more capable of understanding 
psychoanalysis and extending it beyond institutional confines than professional 
psychoanalysts. Their writings are often more helpful than those of Freud’s (or 
Jung’s) devoted acolytes. 
 
The philosopher Jonathan Lear said, “[i]t is part of the logic of psychoanalysis and 
philosophy that they are forms of life committed to living openly – with truth, beauty, 
envy and hate, wonder, awe and dread” (Lear, 1998, p. 5). Living openly suggests an 
attitude that is reflexive in thinking and tentative in judging, which is epitomised by 
the work of the psychotherapist Peter Lomas who, although trained in psychoanalysis, 
was never dogmatic or partisan. In the Guardian obituary on Lomas dated 24 
February 2010, David Ingleby was quoted as describing Lomas as offering “not 
answers, but questions; not dogmas, but doubts”. 
 
Although he acknowledged Freud’s importance, Lomas (1981, 1994, 1999) did not 
shy away from criticising psychoanalysis. While Giegerich theorises in an 
inaccessible manner, his description of his way of working with patients in therapy 
(see above) is not too dissimilar to what Lomas would recommend. Perhaps many 
thoughtful psychoanalysts and psychotherapists do work like this clinically. Lomas 
has emphasised the limitation of techniques and the limitation of analytic 
interpretations; qualities such as ordinariness, openness, receptivity, intuition, 
authenticity and wisdom are much more vital to psychotherapy. To him, therapy is a 
moral practice, not in the sense of moralising or telling the patient what is right and 
wrong, but an attempt to work towards the fundamental human question of how to 
live life, or as Jonathan Lear (2004, 2014) has put it, how to live well. Lear talks about 
freedom as the “final cause” (teleological cause or goal) that psychoanalysis as a 
therapy should be working towards (Lear, 2009). Grappling with the issue of freedom 
is no doubt part of practising psychotherapy as a moral endeavour.  
 
Lear (2014) has summarised what the best attitude towards Freud should be: 
 
All of this suggests that if psychoanalysis is to live up to its promise of being a 
moral psychology—one which contributes as it comes to understand what it is to 
lead a full, rich, meaningful human life—it must find ways to mourn Freud’s 
legacy, and move on. Even now, we are only at the beginning of such a process (p. 
480).  
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